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The high effort of migrants to invest into human capital and the positive se­
lective character of migration are the main explanations for the rapid decrease of 
the earnings gap between migrants and natives, as found in a variety of empirical 
studies on migration to the USA, Canada and Australia. This paper shows that 
in the case of temporary migration the optimal investment into country specific 
human capital is lower than in the case of permanent migration and may not be 
sufficient to allow migrants’ earnings to catch up with those of native workers. 
Furthermore, it is shown that migration is positively selective only under certain 
labor market conditions. Empirical findings support the hypotheses of low hu­
man capital investment in the case of temporary migration. The results strongly 
suggest the need for carefully differentiating between temporary and permanent 
migration when investigating migrant’s earnings assimilation.
‘This paper has been presented at the September 1990 Conference of the European Association of 
Labour Economists in Lund, Sweden, at the September 1990 Summer School of the European Eco­
nomic Association in Lisbon, Portugal, and at the October 1990 Conference of the Italian Association 
of Labour Economists in Rome, Italy. I am grateful to Dennis Snower and Augustin Maravall for 
their helpful suggestions. I especially thank John Micklewright for valuable and stimulating com­
ments made on previous drafts of this paper. This research has been made possible by a grant of the 





















































































































































































1 In tr o d u ctio n
In the last decade the labor market adjustment of immigrants and the speed of adjust­
ment of their wages to the level of the respective native worker has been of growing 
interest to economists. Following Chiswick’s (1978) seminal article, most contributions 
applied some extended version of the human capital earnings function as developed by 
Mincer (1974) to cross-sectional data. Testing the hypotheses of imperfect international 
transferability of skills and the resulting consequences, and self-selection of migrants, 
the focus of interest of these studies has been variables that explain earning differences 
between migrants and native workers. Empirical evidence concerning these questions 
has been presented for various countries as well as for male and female subgroups.1 The 
results indicate that the initial income gap between native and foreign workers nar­
rows the longer the migrant stays. This narrowing is a consequence of country-specific 
human capital investment by immigrants, other things remaining equal. Furthermore, 
for some countries immigrant earnings have even overtaken the earnings of compara­
ble native workers after some time.2 Therefore, empirical findings seem to indicate 
that migrants succeed in compensating for their initial earnings disadvantage by con­
siderable investment effort into country-specific human capital and, furthermore, that 
migrants are a self-selected group, having a higher ability and motivation than the 
average native worker.
However, the kind of migration examined in the above mentioned studies was per­
manent, favoring country-specific human capital investment, and, moreover, the mi­
grant was confronted with highly competitive labor markets, favoring selective migra­
tion. Therefore, the questions arise whether these results remain valid for temporary 
migration and where labor is not only ’’pulled” by a favorable labor market situation 
in the host country, but also ’’pushed” by highly unfavorable conditions in the source 
country.
This paper will try to answer these questions. In particular, the assimilation of 
guest workers to labor market conditions in West Germany and the impact of the 
assimilation process on the earnings differential between guest workers and German 
nationals will be examined, pointing out differences between guest worker migration 
and migration that has a more permanent character.3
1See, for example, Chiswick (1978), Tandon (1978), Long (1980), Chiswick and Miller (1985) and 
Meng 1987
2Chiswick (1978) found that earnings of migrants in the American labor market exceed earnings 
of native-born men with same characteristics after 10-15 years.




























































































Post-war labor inmigration into West Germany started in the mid 50’s and ac­
celerated rapidly until 1973. The percentage of foreigners employed in the labor force 
increased from 0.6% in 1957 to 11.2% in 1973, the highest percentage of foreign workers 
ever employed in West Germany, and declined thereafter.4 This heavy inmigration of 
laborers mainly from Southern European countries was caused by the rapid economic 
development in West Germany after the second world war and the resulting growing 
excess demand for labor. It was supported by high unemployment rates and low per 
capita incomes in the countries of origin. The growing inflow of foreign workers into 
the German labor market was accompanied by a number of measures regulating legal, 
social and labor market conditions. The fear of the unions that foreign labor might 
be used by employers to keep wages down, the interest of employers in encouraging 
recruitment of foreign workers, as well as the effort of source country governments to 
sustain equal rights for their citizens in the host countries were largely responsible for 
a number of agreements that virtually accorded equal treatment of guest workers in 
the German labor market and within the social security system. Furthermore, in the 
60’s recruitment agreements were concluded between Germany and all the main source 
countries which considerably facilitated migration for the worker by guaranteeing him 
a one year contract upon arrival, accommodation and payment of travel expenses. 
Moreover, he could not be dismissed during the first year of residence.5 Recruitment 
activities stopped in 1973, the turning point of the strong economic boom in Germany.
Accordingly, the situation of guest workers coming to Germany was characterized 
by low costs of migration and high rates of return resulting from the considerable 
economic differences between most source countries and the host country; in addition, 
the duration of stay was expected to be temporary both by the governments concerned 
and by the guest worker himself, thus providing a lower incentive to invest into country- 
specific human capital as is the case with permanent migration. Consequently, one 
would expect to find migration to West-Germany to be less selective and the effort of 
the migrant to invest into country-specific human capital to be low.
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 2 develops the theoretical 
framework and points out the implications emerging from the special character of 
temporary migration and the consequences for empirical work. Section 3 discusses 
the data and the different empirical specifications to be estimated and presents the 
empirical results. Besides an analysis of factors causing earning differentials between 
natives and guestworkers based on a pooled dataset of both subsamples, the hypothesis 
will be tested that the expected length of stay influences earnings positively by way of
4Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit, Arbeitsstatistik 1974




























































































country-specific human capital investment. Finally, the various earnings potentials of 
guest workers with different nationalities will be distinguished. The main results will 
then be summarized in Section 4.
2 T h e o re tic a l F ram ew ork  A n d  Im p lica tio n s
2.1 C ountry-Specific H um an C apital Investm ent and th e  D u ­
ration o f Stay
The empirical literature on the speed of adjustment of immigrants to the labor market 
conditions of the country of immigration takes as a point of departure the human capital 
earnings function, as initiated by Becker and Chiswick (1966) and further developed 
by Mincer (1974).
An important characteristic of the human capital approach is the explanation of in­
come differences by way of different individual investment in human capital. The basic 
human capital function, commonly known as the ’’schooling model”, explains differ­
ences in labor incomes in terms of differences in the amount of schooling. Extensions 
of this simple model include post-school investments as a further main determinant for 
the explanation of wage differences. When analyzing earnings functions of immigrants, 
this equation is usually extended by a variable that measures the migrant’s duration of 
residence in the host country. The underlying assumption of this formulation is that 
during his stay in the host country the migrant accumulates country-specific human 
capital. Therefore, holding other variables constant, the time spent in the host country 
is expected to positively influence the income of migrants.
In what follows the conventional human capital equation will be developed and 
extended to include the specific human capital accumulation of immigrants. Both the 
theoretical derivation and the final extended human capital equation will illuminate 
the importance of the length of the period the migrant expects to stay for his effort to 
invest into country-specific human capital.
According to Mincer (1974), it should be assumed that after leaving school the 
worker continues to devote a certain amount of his resources to furthering skills or 
acquiring job related knowledge. Measurable earnings or net earnings are then the 
difference between the workers earnings potential, or gross earnings, and the cost of 
investment into human capital in that period.6 Given a finite working life and ne­
6The cost of investment into human capital is best understood in terms of opportunity costs. If 




























































































glecting depreciation of human capital, the optimal amount of investment will decline 
over time. Since the size of earnings in any period depends on investment activities in 
previous periods, earnings will depend on the length of the period the worker has been 
in the labor force. Accordingly, working experience will explain earning differences 
among otherwise identical workers.
In the case of immigrants, however, a second factor has to be considered. Since 
the human capital the migrant accumulated in his home country is only partially 
transferable to the foreign labor market, not only will the above explained investment 
into human capital continue, but, furthermore, the migrant will transfer country of 
origin specific human capital into host-country specific human capital and will adapt 
host-country specific knowledge. Assuming that these investments are costly, at least 
in terms of foregone earnings, the size of assimilation effort depends on the time the 
worker intends to stay in the host country. Thus, the duration of residence in the 
immigration country as well as the expected total length of stay will help to explain 
income differences between otherwise identical migrants.
According to the above considerations, and using a continuous notation, the in­
stantaneous change in gross income of migrant z, can be written as a first-order 
differential equation with variable coefficient:
E, = [r,ktl + giUi t]Eu (1)
where Eu are gross earnings of migrant i in period t, r; is the rate of return on 
investment in job-specific human capita] and is the rate of return on the migrant’s 
efforts in transferring human capita] corresponding to the needs of the host-country 
labor market and the acquirement of host-country specific knowledge.7 fc;, and /j,( are 
the fractions of the earnings potential devoted to human capital investment, either by 
furthering job specific skills or by transferring human capital and acquiring country- 
specific skills, respectively.8 Solving equation (1) results in the following expression:
Eit =  EjE-So' k‘<d,+°- So dt (2)
where E j  is the migrant’s potential gross-income upon arrival in the host country 
and /, his length of residence. The gross income of a migrant in a certain period thus
weighted with the wage rate that corresponds to worker’s human capital, then the measured income 
equals the full income minus the value of time spent for investment activities.
7For simplification, the rates of return on investment into work-related human capital, r,-, and 
country-related human capital, £>,, are assumed to be constant over time.
8Let Ct be migrant’s investment into job-related human capital and K t his investment into country- 




























































































depends on the gross income potential he accumulated before migration and investment 
into job-specific skills after migration as well as on his effort to acquire country-specific 
knowledge and to transfer skills.9 Following the above procedure, E j can be expressed 
as follows:
Ej =  E‘er' /o'" k“ dt (3)
Li is the length of migrant’s working experience in the home country and Ef is his 
potential income after S years of schooling. Assuming that gross earnings without any 
schooling and training are equal to E°, and further assuming that during school years 
all available time will be devoted to schooling, it follows:
E‘ = E°er’s- (4)
where r‘ is the rate of return to schooling. Combining (2), (3) and (4) and taking 
logarithms:10
£j< = lnE° + r’Si + r, f  kit dt + g, f p,, dt (5)
Jo Jo
T; is the total amount of working experience: 7y = L, + /,. The above equation 
cannot be used for empirical application because the ratios of potential total income 
devoted to human capital investment in any period t , ku and /q(, and the potential 
income Eu are not observable. Measurable income is net income, the difference between 
potential income and the fraction of potential income the worker sacrifices in order to 
further his abilities. Gross income will therefore be replaced by net income using
biEit =  InYn -  ln( 1 -  kit -  p„) (6)
To make (5) applicable for empirical purposes, a specific form of the investment 
functions has further to be specified. Assuming that the fraction of earnings capacity 
which is invested declines linearly during working life and duration of stay, so that
ku =  M l  — ^r) (7-a)
9(2) implies the simplifying assumption that the migrant is in the work force since immigration to 
the host country.
l0Note that (5) implies that the rate of return on job-specific human capital investment, r , , is equal 
for investments undertaken in the country of origin and in the home country. Any differences in the 





























































































where fc,0 and /q0 are the ratios of post-school investment to potential income after 
leaving school and of host-country specific human capital investment to potential in­
come upon entering the host-country, respectively. 7i is the length of working life and 
0, the amount of years the guest worker intends to stay in the host country, j  and h 
are time indices. Either investment ceases if j  = T, or h = 0,. Note that the fraction 
of the migrants earnings potential invested into human capital accumulation at any t 
depends crucially on the expected length of stay 0. Accordingly, the expected length 
of stay should explain earnings differences between otherwise identical migrants.
Inserting (6), (7-a) and (7-b) into (5), solving the integrals and rearranging terms 
results in the following expression:
P i t  =  /'.oil -  j )
lnY« = lnE° + /n(l -  k,t -  /iit) + r’Si + r,k,0Ti -  (8)
Assuming the values of k0, p.0,ra,r  and p as constant among individuals, (8) indi­
cates that differences in migrants’ earnings are explained by different schooling back­
grounds and different working experiences as well as varying durations of residence in 
the host country. Furthermore, the theoretical derivation above suggests that the form 
of the investment profile of migrant workers and thus their earnings at any t depends 
on the migrants expected total duration of stay, 0,. This variable is neglected in all 
studies that investigate the assimilation of the earnings of migrant workers. In the 
case of permanent migration, 0 may not help too much to explain differences among 
migrants’ earnings. However, if 0 varies considerably among individual migrants as it 
is the case with temporary migration, this variable may explain a significant part of 
earnings differences among migrant workers. (8) indicates that, everything else being 
equal, the longer the migrant expects to stay in the host country, the less concave is 
his earnings profile.
Therefore, the steepness of earnings profiles may vary among otherwise identical 
temporary migrants if they have different expectations about how long to stay in the 
host country.
Furthermore, the generally shorter time horizon of migration history in case of 
temporary migration if compared with permanent migration suggests that temporary 
migrant’s earnings profiles should have a lower pattern, resulting from a lower invest­
ment effort into country specific human capital.11




























































































2.2 S elective M igration
The second hypothesis to explain the strong position of permanent migrants in the 
American, Australian and Canadian labor market is, beside a considerable effort to 
invest into country-specific human capital, a positive self-selection of migrants. Arguing 
that the rate of return is higher for a high-ability person than for a low-ability person, 
migration is self-selective.
The underlying assumption of the selective migration hypothesis is that migrants 
are fully employed in both labor markets. If, however, the labor market of the emigra­
tion country is characterized by high unemployment that affects low-ability workers to 
a higher extent than high-ability workers, and if in the immigration country there is 
an excess demand for labor, migration may even be selective in a negative sense.
This can easily be shown by reconsidering and extending Chiswick’s (1986) theoret­
ical argument of positive selective migration. Under the simplifying assumptions that 
earnings do not vary with experience, work life is long and migration costs are incurred 
only in the initial period, the rate of return to the migration decision for a person with 
ability stock k is, according to Chiswick, given by
(wH — ud)(l + k) wH — ws 
r = (1 + k)c° + cD = c° + ŷ cd (9)
where wH and ws are earnings in host- and source country, respectively, c° are 
opportunity (time) costs and cD direct costs of migration. (9) assumes that a person 
with ability level k > 0 has earnings k% higher in both countries than a person with 
ability level k = 0. Since c° are the time costs of migration, these costs increase 
with the ability level. It is obvious from (9), that, for cD > 0, the rate of return 
is higher the higher the ability level. Chiswick then concludes that the incentive to 
migrate is higher for high-ability persons. If abilities are similarly distributed among 
countries, immigrants will consequently have, on average, a higher level of abilities 
than native workers. The selection process will be more intense the larger the direct 
costs of migration, cD.
Chiswicks argument, however, is only true if certain labor market conditions are 
fulfilled. Assume an excess demand for labor in the host country and an excess supply
investment into country-specific human capital will be of no further use. This is a reasonable as­
sumption in case of temporary migration. However, wage-efiective country specific human capital 
investments like learning the foreign language may well be of further use to the permanent migrant 
even after retirement. Accordingly, for some investments the pay-ofT period will be longer for the 




























































































for labor in the source country. In the case of temporary migration, host- and source 
country are often characterized by such labor market situations. Migration is often 
induced by a temporary excess demand for unskilled or semiskilled labor in the host 
country. The labor attracted stems from countries with significantly poorer economic 
conditions and, very often, an excess supply for labor in the low-skilled labor market.
Assume further that in the source country a high ability worker will more easily 
find a job than a low ability worker. Let p(k) be the probability that a worker with 
ability level k is employed in the source country, with p'(k) > 0,p(0) =  0, and let b 
denote an unemployment benefit in the source country. Adopting Chiswick’s notation, 
the rate of return on the migration decision to a worker with ability level k can then 
be written as:12
wH -  [wsp(k) + (1 -p(k))b]
r  = -----------c0 + J _ co-----------  (10)
For ws > b, the gain of migration will be lower the higher the ability level of the 
migrant. Therefore, for some probability distribution p(k), some ability distribution 
and some set of values for earnings, costs and unemployment benefits the rate of return 
could well be highest at very low ability levels.13 In that case, it would be more prof­
itable for the less able workers to migrate: migration would accordingly be negatively 
rather than positively selective. Furthermore, the benefit of migration to a migrant 
with ability level k will be higher the lower the unemployment benefit 6. Low direct 
costs of migration will support the migration decision of those with lower levels of 
abilities.
Although the arguments are extremely simple, the above considerations make clear 
that the kind of the selection process taking place strongly depends on the economic 
situation and the labor market conditions in both, the host- and the source country. 
In terms of the above analysis, the degree and the sign of selectivity depends on the 
distribution of abilities in both, host- and source country, and the correlation between 
unemployment and ability level in the source country. If the rate of return of migration 
were highest for an ability level &*, with k* smaller than the average ability level in the 
host country, migration would tend to be negative selective.
12Since c° are time costs of migration, they will as well depend on p(k). Assuming c° as constant 
does not change the intuition of the argument and simplifies matters.
13Let abilities be normally distributed in the source country, with mean k = 2 and variance a = 1: 
f(k)  ~  N(2,1). Furthermore, let the probability that a person with ability level k is employed be 
equal to the cumulative distribution: p(k) = F(k). If b = 0 and, for instance, wH = c° = 10, ws = 5, 
cD = 1, the rate of return will be highest for an ability level k = 0. One can easily verify that similar 




























































































In the case of West Germany, there was an excess demand for labor during the 
period of highest in-migration, while the labor market conditions in all emigration 
countries were characterized by high unemployment rates. Furthermore, the costs of 
migration were kept fairly low by a variety of agreements, as a result of the interest 
of German employers in attracting foreign workers. Therefore, according to the above 
considerations, migration to West-Germany may have been non-selective or even neg­
ative selective.
To summarize, the above considerations suggest that earnings profiles of tempo­
rary migrants are lower than those of permanent migrants, resulting firstly from a 
shorter pay-off period of temporary migrants for any country-specific human capital 
investment. Lower investment effort is then a result of free choice, based on optimiz­
ing behavior. Secondly, the generally assumed positive selection process is found to 
be strongly dependent on the economic situations of host- and source country. The 
argument is then that in the case of temporary migration economic circumstances may 
favor non-selective or even negative selective migration rather than positive selective 
migration.14
In what follows, the hypotheses of lower earnings profiles of temporary migrants 
compared with those of permanent migrants will be tested, using native workers as 
a reference group. Since in other contributions that have investigated the earnings 
adjustment of permanent migrants it has been found that the earnings gap between 
natives and migrants narrows over time, similar results here would reject the above 
hypotheses. To specify whether the earnings advantages or disadvantages of foreign 
workers relative to native workers are due to any selection process or depend on the 
time horizon the migrant considers as pay-off period of his human capital investment, 
additional tests will be carried out. Using interview data on the expected length of 
stay, it will be tested whether a longer expected total duration of stay in the host coun­
try positively influences country-specific human capital investment and, accordingly, 
migrant’s earnings. Arguing that the migration history of permanent migrants will be 
longer than that of temporary migrants, any significant results would then allow to 
infer on the length of migration history as a crucial characteristic that distinguishes
14Note an important difference between the two arguments that favor a lower earnings pattern: 
While the degree of self selection implies a restriction on the average migrant to relatively improve his 






























































































Country of Origin, Shares 









Panel, wave 1, 1984
the earnings adjustment of temporary and permanent migrants.
Furthermore, the rate of return on human capital investment should be higher for 
those who immigrate with a stock of human capital that is easily transferable to the 
needs of the host country. Assuming that these differences are correlated with the 
country of origin, this hypotheses will be tested, using the subset for immigrants only.
3 E st im a tio n  o f  E arn in gs E q u a tio n s
3.1 D ata  and Sam ple C haracteristics
The empirical analysis below uses as a data base the first wave of the German socio­
economic panel, collected in 1984. The panel is a longitudinal cross-sectional sample on 
a household base, where besides asking about characteristics specific to the household, 
all people above 16 years were personally interviewed. The total sample of the first wave 
consists of 6000 households which can be subdivided into two subsamples, according to 
the nationality of the head of the household. The subsample with a German household 
head comprises 4500 households, whilst that with a household head of Turkish, Spanish, 
Jugoslavian, Greek or Italian nationality comprises 1500 households. This subsample 
is over represented in the total sample in order to provide a sufficient database for an 
empirical analysis.
The data used for this study is restricted to men of foreign and German nationality, 





























































































Sample Characteristics of Native-Born and Foreign-Born males, 1984
Native Born Foreign Born
Mean SD Mean SD
Earnings (DM) 3456 1718 2733 1005
Log of Earnings 8.06 0.40 7.86 0.29
Age 40.36 11.29 39.36 10.73
Years of Schooling0 2.29 3.54 1.22 2.54
Years of Training 3.05 2.46 1.34 2.28
Years of Working Experience 19.72 11.78 19.87 10.68
Married (%) 75.68 42.90 85.45 35.27
Years since Migration * * 15.16 6.78
Language satisfactory (%) * * 38.40 48.65
Language good or very good (%) * * 45.45 49.77
Sample Size 2414 1052
SOURCE: Socio-Economic Panel, wave 1, 1984
°After the age of 14.
guarantee comparability, self-employed persons and state employees are excluded from 
the analysis. The latter group had to be removed from the sample since people with 
non German nationality are usually not allowed to become state employees. The final 
sample is then reduced to 2414 persons with German nationality and 1052 persons 
with foreign nationality. Table (1) reports the summary statistics on the nationalities 
of the subsample for immigrants.
Table (2) compares some economic and socio-economic characteristics of German 
nationals and immigrants with foreign nationality. The average gross-earnings, re­
ported as earnings in the month preceding the interview, are 21% higher for German 
nationals compared with foreign workers. This substantial absolute income difference 
might be partially explained by the different schooling backgrounds of the two groups. 
From the sample information two different variables on the educational background 
can be extracted. Both refer to the level of education received after the age of 14.15 
The variable Schooling (SCH) measures the years spent in school, evening school or 
at university, while the variable Training (TRAIN) measures the years of job-specific
15The empirical analysis below therefore assumes an equal schooling background for all persons 
before the age of 15. A further differentiation of education and schooling was not possible since the 





























































































Expected length of stay and total length of stay of Foreign-Born males, 1984
Interval (in years) < 1 1 < x < 5 5 < x < 10 10 < x < 20 20 < x < 30 > 30
YSM (in %) 0.23 5.8 8.5 70.00 15.00 0.47
ESTAY (in%) 5.98 31.08 22.62 7.79 0.57 31.94“
TOTSTAY (in%) 0.00 0.38 3.42 28.61 28.13 39.44
SOURCE: Socio-Economic Panel, wave 1, 1984
“98.98% of this number intend to stay forever.
education and apprenticeship. The average amount of years of both forms of educa­
tional input is considerably higher for natives than for foreign nationals. Both groups 
have approximately the same average age and working experience (EXP), with working 
experience measured as the amount of years a person was fully employed. A higher 
percentage of foreign nationals in the sample were married. A relatively high percent­
age of guest workers claimed to have at least a satisfactory knowledge of the German 
language, even though none of the countries of origin uses German as a main language. 
The average amount of years since migration is fairly high, indicating that most of the 
guest workers immigrated before 1973, the year when immigration was restricted.
Subdivided into 6 time intervals, Table (3) reports statistics on the percentage of 
migrants that fall into the respective sub category on the years they have already 
spent in Germany, Y SM , the length of time they expect to further remain in Ger­
many, E ST A Y , and the total length of stay, TOT ST  AY. Specifically, the numbers 
for the construction of the variable E ST A Y  are based on interviews which asked for­
eign nationals how long they further expect to stay in Germany. Possible answers were 
forever or a specific number of years. TO TST A Y  is then calculated by simply adding 
the amount of years the migrant intends to stay in future and the number of years 
since migration.
The first row of table (3) indicates that more than 85% of migrants in the sample 
have been in Germany for more than 10 years. The numbers in the second row reveal 
that, while nearly one third of the migrants intend to stay more than 30 years or 
forever, more than half of them intend to return to their home countries within the 
next ten years. The numbers reveal, furthermore, that of the migrant population 
living in Germany less than one third intend to change the temporary status into 
permanent status, even though the expected total length of stay of more than 90% of 




























































































to return to their home countries a high percentage will retire in Germany and return 
after retirement. This is, however, not the case. From those who do not expect to stay 
forever in Germany (68% of the whole sample population) only 3.9% want to return 
after the age of 64.16 This implies that the vast majority of migrants in Germany will 
have to either try to find employment in their home country, live on savings or become 
self-employed after return.
3.2 A  C om parative A nalysis o f Earnings o f G erm an and For­
eign  N ationals
Different empirical specifications of equation (8) will be used for estimation, using data 
on natives, on foreign nationals and a pooled data set. In this section the hypothesis 
will be tested whether, as found for other countries, the earnings of guest workers in 
Germany do catch up with those of German nationals. The assumption of previous 
studies will be adopted that, even if two otherwise identical migrants differ in their 
expected duration of stay, their experience-earnings profiles are the same, i.e. 0< = 0 
V i. This restriction will then be relaxed in section 3.3.
Table (4) reports estimation results using data on German natives (column (1)) 
and a pooled data set of both, foreign nationals and natives (column (2)-(5)). The 
coefficients presented in column (1) emerge from a regression of the natural logarithm 
of monthly earnings on the exogenous variables labor market experience (E X P ), labor 
market experience squared (EXPSQ ), marital status (At), years of schooling (SCH) 
and job-specific education (TRAIN ). The regression equation used to produce the 
coefficients in column (2) is extended by a dummy variable (FOR) that is 1 for foreign 
nationals and by the variables years since migration and years since migration squared, 
(YSM ) and (Y SM SQ ), respectively. These variables are zero for natives. The equa­
tions presented in column (3) -(5) additionally allow for varying parameters of the 
experience variables and the schooling variables between natives and foreign nationals, 
and introduce dummy variables on language abilities, where L2 stand for satisfactory 
knowledge of the German language and i 3 for good or very good knowledge in German.
Except for the schooling variables, the results using the native subsample (column 
(1)) are quite similar to those found for natives in other countries. All coefficients 
have the expected sign and are significantly different from zero. Working experience 
has a positive impact on incomes of natives, but with a decreasing rate. Evaluated at 
5 years of experience, an extra year of being in the labor force increases earnings of




























































































TABLE 4: Regression Analysis of Earnings of Foreign and German Nationals 
(Dependent Variable: Natural Logarithm of Monthly Earnings)____________
var (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
constant 7.44 7.49 7.47 7.45 7.35
(308.78) (338.59) (314.56) (303.04) (179.59)
EXP 0.035 0.031 0.034 0.034 0.034
(14.50) (14.91) (13.64) (13.82) (13.78)
EXPSQ -0.00070 -0.00062 -0.00067 -0.00067 -0.00066
(-12.54) (-12.90) (-11.51) (11.52) (-11.51)
SCII 0.043 0.038 0.039 0.043 0.043
(20.68) (20.34) (20.25) (20.52) (20.53)
TRAIN 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.023 0.023
(7.70) (8.56) (8.28) (7.78) (7.78)
M 0.160 0.160 0.162 0.16 0.160
(8.84) (9.94) (9.91) (9.97) (10.08)
FOR -0.177 -0.125 -0.045 -0.0038
(-4.28) (-2.54) (-0.85) (-0.07)
FOR*YSM 0.0024 0.0066 0.0085 0.0068
(0.74) (1.77) (2.27) (1.79)
FOR*YSMSQ -0.000016 -0.000067 -0.000089 -0.000075
(-0.34) (-1.31) (-1.74) (-1.46)
FOR*EXP -0.009 -0.014 -0.013
(-2.16) (-3.11) (-3.02)










ADJ. R2 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.25
No. o f Obs. 2414 3466 3466 3466 3466
SOURCE: Socio- Economic Panel, wave 1, 1984
Note: t-ratios in parenthesis. Regression results presented in column (1) 
are generated using the data set on German nationals only; results in 




























































































natives by 2.8%. However, after 15 years of working experience the positive impact of 
an additional year of experience has been reduced to 1.4%. The impact of schooling 
and job-specific education on earnings of natives are quite different; while an extra 
year of job-specific education raises income by 2.2%, the impact of an additional year 
of after-elementary schooling is considerably greater (4.3%). However, the coefficient 
of the schooling variable is considerably smaller than those found for other countries.17 
Married men have incomes 16% higher than non-married men, a fact that is often 
explained in the literature by a more stable lifestyle of those being married.
Column (2) reports results emerging from using the pooled data set. The coefficient 
on the variable for foreign nationality (FOR) indicates that, holding experience and 
education constant, the earnings of foreign nationals are 17.7% lower than earnings of 
German nationals.18 The considerably poorer educational background of guestworkers 
is therefore responsible for only a small narrowing of the income gap, compared with 
the overall income difference of 21% (Table 2).19 Coefficients on the variables YSM  
and YSM SQ  have the expected sign, but are not significant.20 These results indicate 
that the duration of stay in the host country does not have a narrowing impact on 
the income gap between German nationals and guest workers. However, allowing for 
varying parameters on the experience variable between the two groups slightly increases 
size and significance of the Y S M -coefficient (see results in column (3)), thus indicating 
that Y SM  does not generally narrow the income gap between German and foreign 
nationals but has a decreasing impact on the working experience disadvantage of foreign 
nationals in the German labor market. Although each year of further residence narrows 
the income gap between the two groups, a year of working experience increases earnings 
of German nationals more than that of foreign nationals. Migrants do invest into 
country-specific human capital, but the increasing impact of their overall investment 
on earnings is low'er than that of native workers.
To further differentiate income differences among the two groups, the coefficients 
of the educational variables are allowed to vary between foreign and German nationals
17Chiswick and Miller (1985) report, that an additional year of schooling increases incomes of Aus­
tralian natives by 8.2%; the impact of an additional year of schooling on earnings found for American 
natives is 7.2% (Chiswick, 1978), that for Canadian natives 7.1% (Tandon, 1978)
18Note that the coefficients of variables that are zero for natives measure the differential effect 
of that variable on migrant’s earnings, relative to native’s earnings. The absolute impact of those 
variables on migrants earnings are discussed in section 3.3, using the subset of migrants only.
19Results in column (2), table(4), do not control for the quality of schooling and training received. 
However, allowing for variations in the schooling and training coefficients by introducing dummies 
that are respectively 1 if training or schooling was done in Germany yielded insignificant results.
20The null hypothesis of the coefficients of Y S M  and YSM SQ  being jointly equal t,o zero could 




























































































and additional variables on language abilities are added. Results are given in columns 
(4) and (5) of table (4). Evaluated at, for instance, 10 years of working experience 
and 5 years of residency in Germany, these numbers indicate that an additional year of 
residency will increase the income gap between German nationals and foreign nationals 
by 0.22% (column (4)). The widening impact of residency on the income gap rises to 
0.47% for those with a poor knowledge of the German language (column (5)).
Accordingly, there is no earnings crossover and no narrowing impact of the duration 
of residence on the income gap between employed guestworkers and German nationals 
as found in other empirical studies on migrant’s earnings. Guest workers do accumulate 
country-specific human capital, but investments are not sufficient to catch up with 
native earnings.
The effect of an additional year of schooling of foreign citizens on monthly earnings is 
significantly lower than for German nationals. The difference of nearly 50% is certainly 
due to the fact that schooling mainly took place in the home countries and is therefore 
of small value in the German labor market. The difference of the impact of job specific 
education is not statistically significant, suggesting that this investment into human 
capital was done predominantly in the host country or that it is highly transferable to 
the needs of the host country.
Furthermore, having a good or very good knowledge of the German language nar­
rows the income gap considerably (9%).21 The coefficient of the variable for satisfactory 
language ability, L2, though having the expected sign, is not statistically significant, 
indicating that, in order to catch up with native earnings, satisfactory knowledge of 
the German language is not sufficient.
The above results indicate that, in contrast to the findings for other countries, there 
is no wage catch-up of foreign nationals in the German labor market. Moreover, the 
income gap between guest workers and German nationals continues to increase with the 
duration of stay, thus implying that there is not only no additional effort of migrants 
to catch up with native earnings, but overall human capital investment is even lower 
than that of the respective native worker. The empirical findings seem to support 
the hypotheses stated above: First, temporary migrants may be less willing to invest 
amounts into human capital sufficiently to catch up with native earnings. Secondly, 
guestworker migration to West Germany may be less selective as permanent migration 
to Australia, Canada or the United States. On the basis of the above results it is,
21 Note that coefficients on the language variables measure differential effects, both compared with 




























































































however, not possible to specify whether both or only one hypothesis is responsible for 
the increasing earnings gap between migrants and natives. Using the subset of migrants 
alone, the hypothesis that a longer expected duration of stay positively influences 
human capital investment and, therefore, migrant’s earnings, will be tested below. 
Since the duration of stay will, on average, be longer for the permanent migrant than for 
the temporary migrant, estimation results can be considered as a test of the hypothesis 
that temporary migrants do worse in any labor market, compared with permanent 
migrants, because their optimally chosen human capital investments are lower.
3.3 Im m igrant Earnings, th e E xpected  D uration  o f S tay  and 
N ational D ifferences
Turning to an analysis of earnings of the subgroup of foreign nationals only, this section 
will, besides analyzing parameter differences using the subsamples on natives and im­
migrants, be particularly concerned with the effect of the expected duration of stay on 
country-specific human capital investment. Specifically, using data on the expected to­
tal duration of stay as described in section 3.1, the parameters on the V’SMS’Q-variable 
will be allowed to vary amongst individuals. Furthermore, estimation equations will be 
extended by allowing for variations in the V’.9iU-variable amongst nationalities, thus 
analyzing which nationality has the greatest rate of returns on country-specific human 
capital investment.
3.3.1 Im m igrants Absolute Earnings Development
The first two columns of table (5) present estimation results, using the subset of mi­
grants alone. Comparing results in column (1) and (2) of table (5) with those in column 
(1) of table (4) reveals that the effect of both educational variables on migrant’s earn­
ings is found to be considerably smaller than on native’s earnings, as was indicated 
by the results using the pooled sample. The variables schooling (SCH) and training 
(TR A IN ) have approximately the same impact on immigrants’ earnings. This, how­
ever, is not the case when German nationals are considered, where (SCH) has a 33% 
higher impact on earnings than does (TRAIN ).
Being married has a higher impact on native incomes than on guest worker incomes. 
This may be due to the fact that, even if not married, guest workers often have obli­
gations to relatives in the home country and are therefore forced to behave in a more 




























































































TABLE 5: Regression Analysis of Earnings of Foreign Nationals 
(Dependent Variable: Natural Logarithm of Monthly Earnings)
VAR (1) (2) (3) (4)
CONSTANT 7.42 7.37 7.42 7.43
(200.68) (180.66) (200.36) (213.25)
EXP 0.0229 0.0229 0.0220 0.0235
(7.42) (7.47) (7.04) (7.79)
EXPSQ -0.00050 -0.00047 -0.00047 -0.00047
(-7.42) (-7.12) (-7.02) (-7.07)
SCH 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.020
(5.55) (5.34) (5.42) (5.75)
TRAIN 0.017 0.017 0.18 0.018
(4.72) (4.52) (4.65) (4.91)
M 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11
(3.77) (4.05) (3.82) (4.26)
YSM 0.0088 0.0072 0.0061 0.0087
(3.03) (2.44) (2.02) (3.25)

















ADJ.R2 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14
SOURCE: The Socio-Economic Panel, 1984 




























































































The effect of the duration of residence in Germany on income is, as expected, 
positive and decreases over time. Although human capital investment is not sufficient 
to improve the earnings position of migrants relative to native workers, as shown above, 
country-specific human capital investment does have a significant positive impact on 
migrants absolute earnings position. Based on arrival point, an additional year of 
residence increases earnings by 0.86%. After 10 years in Germany, this number reduces 
to 0.67%. Adding dichotomous variables for language abilities as additional indicators 
of assimilation to the estimation equation only slightly decreases the coefficient of the 
FSAf-variable. The results are similar to those found if using the pooled sample: guest 
workers with a satisfactory knowledge of the German language have earnings 4% higher 
than their colleagues with poor language knowledge. This income difference increases 
to 8.7% if the latter group is compared with guest workers with good or very good 
language knowledge. These considerable differences in income due to language ability 
indicate that even in the low-skilled or semi-skilled labor market language ability is 
thought to be correlated with productivity by German employers; it may also indicate 
that workers with knowledge of the German language are more capable of acquiring 
and using specific labor market information and, consequently, obtain better-paid jobs.
3.3.2 Earnings and the Expected D uration of Stay
As already indicated in section (2), the decision of an individual whether, and how 
much, to invest in human capital depends on the time horizon he considers as the pay­
off period for a given investment. Assuming the absence of depreciation, for a given 
interest rate and rate of return, the investment will be smaller the smaller the remaining 
productive period. In the case of migrants, and defining a linear investment function 
for country-specific human capital investment, the resulting earnings equation indicates 
that the parameter on the quadratic term of residence in the host-county differs among 
individuals according to their expected total duration of stay.
Allowing the earnings profiles to vary among migrants with identical characteris­
tics, but different expected durations of stay, requires the estimation of a regression 
equation with varying coefficients on the variable YSM SQ , as indicated by (8). The 
construction of the variable TOT , used as empirical specification of the variable 0 in 
the above theoretical equation, is based on interview data. When the guest worker 
intends to return before reaching retirement age (which was assumed to be equal to 
65) TOT  is calculated as the sum of the expected total duration of stay and the years 
since migration; it is therefore equal to TOT ST  AY  above. However, it is assumed 
that after an active working life no earnings-effective country specific human capital 




























































































retirement age or to stay forever, TOT  was constructed by adding to the years since 
migration the difference between 65 and the age of the migrant.
Estimation results are given in column (4) of table (5). The numbers indicate 
that the expected duration of stay positively influences investment effort in country 
specific human capital and, therefore, the migrant’s earnings position. After five years 
of residence, an additional year in the country will increase migrants earnings by 0.11% 
if the expected total duration of stay is ten years; this number increases to 0.49% if 
the migrant intends to stay for 20 years and to 0.86% if he expects to stay for 30 
years. These results therefore strongly support the hypothesis, suggested by the above 
theoretical considerations, that the amount of investment made by temporary migrants 
in country-specific human capital depends positively on their expected length of stay 
in the host country. Since the length of stay of permanent migrants will generally be 
longer than that of temporary migrants, the results indicate that the poor assimilation 
of temporary migrants earnings to earnings of native workers, as it was found in this 
study and as it is in contrast to results of other studies analyzing earnings assimilation 
of permanent migrants, can be explained to some extend by a lower effort of investment 
into country specific human capital. This lower effort is due to a shorter pay off period 
of any investment undertaken.
3.3.3 N ational Differences
Column (3) of table (5) reports results after allowing for varying coefficients on the 
YSM-variable among different nationalities. Arguing that the rate of return on equal 
investment is higher for those who accumulated human capital in their home countries 
that is easily transferable to the needs of the host country, one would expect that 
those coming from countries with similar labor market requirements would have higher 
coefficients.22
The group excluded from the set of dummy variables are Spanish nationals. The 
variables Y S M i , i =  T ,J , G, I  measure therefore the differential effect of an additional 
year of residence among Spanish nationals and Turkish, Jugoslavian, Greek and Ital­
ian nationals, respectively. This effect is insignificant between subgroups of Turkish 
and Spanish guest workers. Comparing the other subgroups with the reference group 
suggests that a year of residence increases earnings of Yugoslavian and Italian workers 
by 0.5% more than those of Spanish workers. If the groups start with equal initial
22Equation (8) implies that parameters on YSMSQ should also vary. However, empirical tests yield 





























































































incomes, then, after 15 years of residence, earnings of Italian and Jugoslavian workers 
will be 7.5% higher, and those of Greek workers will be 6.3% higher, than earnings of 
Spanish and Turkish nationals. These results are not surprising for the Turkish sub­
group. A high percentage of Turkish guestworkers come from eastern Turkey with a 
prevailing agricultural economy. Thus one would expect the transferability of skills to 
the needs of the highly industrialized German economy to be lower than for Southern 
Europeans. However, it is surprising that Spanish guestworkers do relatively badly in 
the German labor market.
4 S u m m a ry  and  C on clu sion
Empirical studies on earnings assimilation of permanent migrants to the USA, Canada 
and Australia have shown that the initial earnings gap between migrants and native 
workers steadily decreases over the time the migrant spends in the host country. The 
main explanations for the narrowing of this earnings gap between migrants and native 
workers are the high effort of migrants to invest into human capital and the positive 
selective character of migration.
This paper has shown that the elTort of the migrant to invest into human capital 
specific to the labor market requirements of the host country positively depends on 
his expected total length of stay. Furthermore, migration will be positively selective 
only if certain labor market conditions are fulfilled in both, host- and source countries. 
In the case of temporary migration, the average total duration of stay will be shorter 
than in the case of permanent migration. This implies, according to the theoretical 
considerations, a lower effort of investment into human capital. Consequently, tempo­
rary migrants should do worse in the foreign labor market than permanent migrants. 
Moreover, in the case of temporary migration, labor market conditions in both coun­
tries are often likely to be unfavorable to positive selection, thereby reinforcing the 
weak position of these migrants in the host country labor market.
To test the hypotheses of low human capital investment and non selective migration 
in respect of temporary migration, monthly earnings of German and temporary foreign 
workers were analyzed using data from the first wave of the German socio-economic 
panel. The empirical results indicate that, unlike the findings for permanent migration 
to other countries, temporary foreign workers receive lower wages than their native 
counterparts throughout their working history in the host country, other things being 
equal. There is no earnings-crossover between these two groups. Moreover, the income 
gap between temporary workers and natives in the German labor market actually 




























































































Using data on the expected length of stay in the host country, empirical findings sup­
port the hypothesis that the total length of stay positively influences country-specific 
human capital investment and, therefore, earnings of migrants. Since the total length 
of stay of a permanent migrant will generally be longer than that of a temporary mi­
grant, a lower effort to invest into human capital may be mainly responsible for the 
poor earnings assimilation of temporary migrants compared with that of permanent 
migrants.
Other findings are that language ability has a surprisingly high impact on narrowing 
the earnings differential between temporary workers and natives in the German labor 
market. Furthermore, using the subsample on migrants, it was found that Turkish 
and Spanish workers have the lowest rates of return on country-specific human capital 
investment, compared with Italian, Jugoslavian and Greek workers. These results may 
imply a lower transferability of human capital acquired in the home countries to the 
needs of the German labor market.
The results of this paper strongly suggest that it is important to carefully differen­
tiate between permanent and temporary migration when considering the assimilation 
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